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ABSTRACT
Objective: To assess how much patients with long-term conditions value
self-efﬁcacy (i.e., conﬁdence in their ability to manage their condition)
compared with other health outcomes, including measures of quality of
life, and process outcomes including access to General Practitioners.
Methods: Discrete Choice Experiment (DCE) set in UK community set-
tings. Participants: 367 patients (mean age 57.5) living in the community
with a wide range of self-deﬁned long-term conditions. Main outcome
measures: the relative value that individuals place on four speciﬁc out-
comes, namely, self-efﬁcacy, Health Related Quality of Life (HRQoL),
access to General Practitioners, and level of isolation.
Results: Most responders completed their questionnaire in a consistent
manner. Most valuations of outcomes were in the expected direction and
were statistically signiﬁcant. A substantial minority of responders exhib-
ited counter-intuitive preferences. The existence of a signiﬁcant constant in
all models raised concerns about model misspeciﬁcation. Nevertheless, all
models showed that participants were willing to trade substantial reduc-
tions in their HRQoL for improvements in their self-efﬁcacy.
Conclusions: The majority of patients with chronic conditions were able to
complete the DCE questionnaires. However, the existence of counter-
intuitive preferences and evidence of model misspeciﬁcation require further
investigation. These issues are largely overlooked in the health economics
literature. Self-efﬁcacy is an important outcome for this group and is not
included explicitly in conventional HRQoL measures. This is potentially
important where decisions are made on the basis of cost-effectiveness using
Quality Adjusted Life Years as the metric. Exclusion of these outcomes may
lead to the cost-effectiveness of these interventions being understated.
Keywords: Discrete Choice Experiment, health economics, Quality
Adjusted Life-Years, quality of life.
Introduction
Recent policy has targeted self-care as a means to improve
patient outcomes and reduce costs [1,2]). Self-care has been
deﬁned as care taken by individuals toward their own health and
well-being [2]. Interventions have been designed that support
individuals’ ability to self-care, for example, the Expert Patient
Programme (EPP) based on the chronic disease self-management
program developed in the United States by Lorig [3,4]. The
“EPP” aims to provide self-care support to any individual with a
chronic condition in England and is a generic, lay led, group
program involving six-weekly sessions. The EPP is designed to
enable participants to develop appropriate self-care skills includ-
ing patient’s “self-efﬁcacy” [5]. The concept of self-efﬁcacy refers
to a psychological state which relates to an individual’s conﬁ-
dence that they can achieve some task (such as managing the
symptoms of their disorder or engage in regular exercise) [6–8],
and is one of the most important concepts in modern psycho-
logical approaches to understanding health behavior [9]. Self-
efﬁcacy is increasingly accepted as a mediating variable and an
outcome of self-management programs but this has become nor-
mative without evidence of what patients most value in manag-
ing long-term conditions.
A recent trial [5] demonstrated that a UK version of the chronic
disease self-management program was effective at improving self-
efﬁcacy, and a cost-effectiveness analysis based on the same clini-
cal trial [10] generated Quality Adjusted Life-Year (QALY) gains
for these interventions using the EQ5D instrument. The EQ5D
instrument measures Health Related Quality of Life (HRQoL),
across ﬁve dimensions, namely mobility, ability to self-care, ability
to perform usual activities, level of pain/discomfort, and level of
anxiety/depression. The cost-effectiveness analysis concluded that
the EPP intervention was likely to provide a cost-effective alterna-
tive to usual care in people with long-term conditions at com-
monly used threshold values of a QALY.
Thus QALYs, often generated from EQ5D, have a commonly
expressed value [11] but they may not incorporate all the out-
comes that are of interest. In contrast, while self-efﬁcacy is
undoubtedly an outcome of interest (at least for practitioners and
researchers), we have no knowledge of whether self-efﬁcacy is
“of value” per se, or indeed what that value might be. This leads
to problems of interpretation as decision-makers cannot assess
the relative merits of self-efﬁcacy compared with HRQoL. In the
example above, the EPP was deemed to be likely to be cost-
effective based solely on the QALY, although there was a large
degree of uncertainty around the decision. Valuing self-efﬁcacy
(or other relevant outcomes) in terms of QALYs gives decision-
makers additional information and can be incorporated into the
cost-effectiveness analysis and could reduce the uncertainty
around a decision.
Discrete Choice experiments (DCEs) are one method of either
expanding the measure of outcome or incorporating factors
other than health outcomes [12]. DCEs are based on the premise
that the beneﬁts associated with health-care interventions can be
expressed in terms of the “attributes or characteristics” of that
intervention [13] and the “attributes or characteristics” of the
person valuing them [14,15].
Process outcomes may be important in the evaluation of
health-care technologies, and DCE enables the relative values of
these outcomes to be assessed [12]. For example, speed of access
to health care, who provides that health care and where it is
provided, are often considered as important aspects of health
care that may not be captured by a measure of HRQoL [12].
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DCEs have been used frequently in the health economics litera-
ture to estimate preferences in miscarriage management [16],
management of prostate cancer [17], as well as in a variety of
other conditions and in numerous settings [18–29]. However,
DCEs have not been previously employed to investigate the
trade-off between HRQoL, psychological outcome measures
such as self-efﬁcacy, and social outcomes such as isolation and/or
process outcomes such as General Practitioner (GP) access. One
advantage of the DCE methodology is that it enables the indi-
vidual to simultaneously compare and value a number of differ-
ent attributes. This may have the added beneﬁt of limiting the
“salience” problem identiﬁed with standard gamble techniques,
where there is discordance between stated preferences and actual
choices because of the experiment focusing the individuals’ con-
centration on one speciﬁc attribute [30], although it is acknowl-
edged that responders may still not focus on the true opportunity
cost of their choice [31].
This article describes a DCE conducted to examine the rela-
tionship between HRQoL and other outcomes which may be of
relevance to patients with long-term conditions. In addition, the
estimation of rates of substitution between the QALY and self-
efﬁcacy enables decision-makers to include these outcomes in
their assessment of cost-effectiveness.
Methods
The authors conducted a DCE: a questionnaire based stated
choice method, to explore the outcomes that are most valued by
patients. There are several recognized steps for conducting a
DCE [32,33], described below.
Deﬁning Attributes/Outcomes
Qualitative interviews and focus groups carried out alongside a
Randomised Controlled Trial of the EPP identiﬁed isolation and
access to health professionals as a major inﬂuence on individual
well-being [34]. In addition a systematic review of the published
economic evaluation literature identiﬁed self-efﬁcacy as an
important outcome that patients valued [35]. The attributes and
their levels were chosen to be plausible for the responders to
answer [32].
Based on these sources, three outcomes were selected for
inclusion into the study and access to GPs, level of social isola-
tion and level of self-efﬁcacy (patients’ conﬁdence in their ability
to manage their condition). In addition, because the rationale of
the study was to assess the importance of self-efﬁcacy and the
other outcomes relative to HRQoL and examine whether such
outcomes could be included in cost-effectiveness analysis, a
measure of HRQoL was included. As it is frequently used in
economic evaluation and has previously been used in DCEs
[36,37], the EQ5D was used as the basis for measuring HRQoL.
EQ5D measures patient health status across ﬁve dimensions
(mobility, self-care, usual activities, pain/discomfort, and anxiety/
depression) with three possible responses (no problems, moder-
ate problems, or severe problems) for each dimension. This
locates each participant into one of 243 mutually exclusive
health states. Clearly, including this number of levels of an
attribute is impractical. Three states were selected as levels for
this attribute to maintain the statistical efﬁciency of the experi-
ment. The three states showed a clear ranking between them and
were all levels that were considered plausible for this patient
group [32] and that they were likely to have experienced.
The use of “psychological” outcomes in DCEs, such as self-
efﬁcacy, is potentially limited by the interpretation responders
place on them. It could be argued that these outcomes depend on
emotional state of the individual or could be merely acting as
surrogates for other outcomes (such as HRQoL). However, evi-
dence from the pilot study suggests that this may not be a major
problem in this study. It should also be noted that these problems
are not unique to this DCE, or DCEs in general. Indeed, similar
issues of interpretation have been identiﬁed with “objective”
measures of health status such as the SF36 [38,39]. The general-
ized Linear Latent and mixed models (GLLAMM) model
described below also allows valuations of attributes from differ-
ent groups with systematically different values. This model
estimates that the proportion of individuals in each “latent
class,” and allows the preferences of these different classes to be
estimated.
The endogeneity of this measure is also a potential problem.
Ideally, it may be better to describe objective outcomes (such as
a health state) and derive values for this health state from indi-
viduals rather than asking them to value a subjective health state
such as conﬁdence. While this is a limitation of the study, the
policy aim was to establish the value of self-efﬁcacy (or isolation
or GP access) relative to HRQoL. This is an important policy
question as the EPP was purchased and rolled out based on the
results of experiments showing improvements in self-efﬁcacy.
Self-efﬁcacy could be considered an important outcome in its
own right, not just as a surrogate for future improved health.
To improve the statistical efﬁciency of the experiment (that is
to enhance the power of the study to detect the impact of moving
between levels of attributes), the number of levels in each attribute
should be multiples of each other [40]. That is if we have four
attributes, we could have three with four levels and one with two
levels, or even one with eight levels. We should not, however, have
some attributes with two levels and others with three. The prac-
tical implication for this DCE was that there should be four
attributes each with three levels (as having three levels for each
clearly satisﬁes the above requirement). Having more than three
levels for each attribute increases the number of questions
responders is asked and therefore increases the cognitive burden
considerably.
Not only is this design statistically efﬁcient, but it also enables
some two-way interactions terms to be examined in a longer
version of the questionnaire described below. These interaction
terms are typically ignored in DCEs in the health economics ﬁeld.
The attributes and levels identiﬁed from this process are
presented in Table 1.
Short and Long Questionnaires
Two questionnaires were developed. Both questionnaires used
the same attributes with identical levels; however, the number of
questions differed. The shorter questionnaire contained 10 ques-
tions (8 unique questions and 1 repeated question), while the
longer questionnaire contained 28 questions (26 unique and 1
repeated). This allowed us to test whether questionnaire length
(and therefore cognitive burden) impacted on response rate. In
addition, the longer questionnaire enables the inclusion of inter-
action terms in the model. Interaction effects are ignored in most
DCEs in the health economics literature as they add to complex-
ity and to the cognitive burden for respondents. In this DCE the
possibility that there were “interactions” between the attributes
described in the DCE was explored. For example, being in a bad
health state may reduce an individuals’ utility by 0.2 and having
low levels of conﬁdence may reduce utility reduces by 0.1.
However, having both bad health and low conﬁdence may result
in a drop of utility greater than 0.3.
The main results section presents results where the responses
to short and long questionnaires were pooled, so that both
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questionnaires have an impact on the coefﬁcients in the “main
effect” model. Separate analyses were performed to identify any
differences between questionnaires, for example, there may be
more inconsistent responses on the longer questionnaire.
Questionnaire Methods
Hypothetical choice sets were created using a fractional factorial
design with fold over [41]. For this DCE, the ﬁrst scenario was
generated from a catalogue of designs [41] and had health state
at level 1, self-efﬁcacy at level 2, GP access at level 2, and
isolation at level 3. This can be represented as 1223 and would
form one scenario in the choice set. To generate the comparison,
which responders will choose between, levels are “folded over.”
Thus, in this DCE, level 1 becomes level 2, 2 becomes 3 and 3
becomes 1. Therefore, 1223 becomes 2331 when folded over.
The comparator then becomes health state at level 2, self-efﬁcacy
at level 3, GP access at level 3, and isolation at level 1. This
creates one choice set. The procedure is repeated for the number
of questions to be asked to create the full questionnaire.
This design is commonly used in DCEs in health and other
disciplines, as it allows for a relatively efﬁcient estimation of the
coefﬁcients around attributes [40]. These designs inevitably lose
some information when compared with the full factorial design
[40] (where the full range of combinations of attributes and their
levels are presented), but reduces the cognitive burden for
respondents. Each choice set required the respondent to select
one of the unlabelled options A or B (i.e., it was a “forced
choice”). Some authors [42] have suggested that additional
options should be included (such as an opt-out clause) so that the
experiment is not a forced choice, while others [43] have claimed
that this may increase the number of neutral responses and
thereby the “power” of the study. Pilot work on this study
indicated that neutral responses were likely in this DCE and a
forced choice was chosen as appropriate.
The design of questionnaires was orthogonal, that is main
effects could be estimated without correlation with other main
effects or interactions [41,44] (i.e., the individual attributes have
an independent effect on utility). While this is usually a desirable
characteristic, it does not allow for any a priori information
about responders preferences [45]. In this instance however,
although we had identiﬁed important attributes, we had no a
priori knowledge of their relative importance and an orthogonal
design was appropriate. Other desirable characteristics [36] of
DCE’s are level balance, where each level of each attribute
appears the same amount of times in the scenarios, and minimal
overlap, where the attribute level is the same in a given choice set
should be minimized (thus for example, if Option A has health
state 1, Option B should ideally not have health state at level 1).
This DCE is an unlabelled experiment in that the labels (A
and B) give no additional information. The only information
individuals have is provided by the attributes and their levels
[40]. There is no hypothesized good or service associated with
the attributes and their levels. An example of the questions facing
patients is presented in Figure 1.
Table 1 Attributes/outcomes for Discrete Choice Experiment
Attribute Levels
Health Related Quality
of Life
1. No problems with mobility, usual activities,
self-care or anxiety/depression. Moderate
pain/discomfort
2. No problems with usual activities, self-care
or anxiety/depression. Some problems
with mobility and moderate pain/
discomfort
3. No problems with usual activities. Some
problems with mobility and self-care.Also
moderate pain/discomfort and moderate
anxiety/depression
Level of conﬁdence 1. Totally conﬁdent in ability to manage
condition
2. Moderately conﬁdent in ability to manage
condition
3. Not at all conﬁdent in ability to manage
condition
Access to General
Practitioner
1. General Practitioner appointment
tomorrow
2. General Practitioner appointment in one
week
3. General Practitioner appointment in 3
weeks
Level of isolation 1. See friends/relatives daily
2. See friends/relatives every few days
3. See friends/relatives rarely
A
• You have 
no problems walking about 
no problems with self-care 
no problems with usual activities 
moderate pain or discomfort 
no anxiety or depression 
B
• You have 
some problems walking about 
no problems with self-care 
no problems with usual activities 
moderate pain or discomfort 
no anxiety or depression 
• You are not confident you can 
manage your condition
OR • You are totally confident you can 
manage your condition
• You can have a GP appointment 
tomorrow
• You can have a GP appointment in 
3 days’ time
• You see your friends or relatives 
daily
• You rarely see friends or relatives
Please tick one box: 
Choice A Choice B
Figure 1 Imagine that you can have either Option
A or Option B, which would you choose? If you
would choose the option where you have moder-
ate pain or discomfort, are not conﬁdent that you
can manage your condition but you can have a
General Practitioner (GP) appointment tomorrow
and you see friends or relatives daily (i.e., every-
thing in columnA) then choose OptionA.However,
if you would prefer the option where you have
moderate pain or discomfort as well as having
some problems with walking, but you are totally
conﬁdent that you can manage your condition with
a GP appointment in 3 days’ time,but you rarely see
friends or relatives (i.e., everything in column B),
then choose Option B.
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Consistency
One question was repeated to check that patients responded in the
same way to each, as a check for “rationality” [46]. Speciﬁcally,
this repeated question tests for consistency in response. Where the
responder gave different answers to the same question, this was
considered “irrational,” for the purposes of this analysis. There is
a large literature on testing for rationality of responses in DCEs
(see for example [47–52]), and a degree of controversy over what
constitutes “irrationality,” how to test for rationality and how to
proceed with “irrational” responses.
As there is a lack of consensus on testing for, and the
appropriate method for dealing with, “irrational” responses
[47,51,52], analyses including and excluding these “irrational”
responses were conducted.
Pilot Study
Questionnaires were tested via a pilot study. Issues of interest
included whether patients understood the questionnaire, whether
the attributes were traded, whether one attribute dominated the
others, and whether the responses were internally consistent. For
the pilot study, 27 individuals with a chronic health problem
completed a questionnaire and were then telephone interviewed.
In general, patients understood the exercise, although the hypo-
thetical nature of the experiment was not emphasized sufﬁciently.
The hypothetical nature of the study was stressed more for the
main study questionnaire. Several responders felt that the long
questionnaire was repetitive, but most patients agreed with the
choice of attributes. Some responders identiﬁed other attributes
which they felt may be important such as continuity of care and
the quality of the interaction with health professional(s). Several
responders stated that they would have opted out of the choice
where there was little perceived difference between the options
offered, if they had been given an opt-out option. These respon-
dents were ultimately able to make a choice between the options,
and for this reason the opt-out was excluded from this question-
naire. The downside to the omission of the opt-out is that there
is a possibility of overstating the importance or relative weight of
attributes in the DCE.
Responders were asked speciﬁcally whether they felt the
attributes measured in the study were important. Several stated
that conﬁdence was very important, as it gave them “permission
to manage their condition;” others felt that conﬁdence was not
an issue for them and that, for example, “pain was the only issue
for me.” While these are far from conclusive, this would appear
to support the notion that responders were treating the conﬁ-
dence dimension separately from the quality of life dimension.
Main Study
Postal questionnaires were sent to a sample of individuals who
had taken part in the EPP trial. Patients, who were involved in
the randomized controlled trial (RCT) of the EPP and had not
indicated that they would prefer not to receive any more ques-
tionnaires, were included in the study. Thus the study sample was
patients with a (self-deﬁned) chronic condition and there were no
exclusion criteria. A free phone number was provided for any
questions patients might have had. Patients who did not respond
after 2 weeks received a written reminder.
Model Estimation
The DCE was analyzed by treating each choice between pairs as
a single observation.
In each choice the rational respondent will choose the option
that yields the highest level of utility to them and so in choice j
individual i will choose B over A if UjBi > UjAi. From the construc-
tion of these indirect utility functions it can be shown that the
difference in utility is due to the difference in attributes between
Option A and B in choice j and the error term.
y U U U x x
s
ij jBi jAi jBi jAi jB N NjB
i
* . . .
. . .
= = − = + + + +(
+ + +
- β β β
γ γ
0 1
0 1 1 γ ε β β
β γ γ γ ε
M Mi jBi jA
N NjA i M Mi jAi
s x
x s s
+ ) − + + +(
+ + + + + )
0 1
0 1 1
. . .
. . . = +
+ + − = + + +
β
β ε ε β β ε
1 1
1 1
Δ
Δ
x
x x xN N jBi jAi j N Nj ji. . . . . .
where x1j = x1jB - x1jA and eji = (ejBi - ejAi)
As speciﬁcation individual characteristics appear in equal
measure on both sides of the difference equation, they simply
difference out and hence the decision to choose A over B or B
over A is independent of individuals’ observable characteristics,
including their health status. In this homogenous model, indi-
viduals may value the proﬁles differently, but the expectation of
the difference between the utilities of the two proﬁles will be the
same for all individuals, but will differ in reality subject to the
realization of the error terms.
The dependent variable yij* is unbounded and continuous,
and it may be positive indicating a preference for B over A, or
negative indicating a preference for A over B. It may also be 0
which would indicate indifference between the two choices.
However the analyst does not observe this latent variable but
instead observes the outcome, yij —a binary outcome equal to 1 if
Option B is chosen and 0 if A is chosen. Thus;
y yij ij=
>⎧⎨⎩
1 0
0
if 
otherwise
*
The participants’ response to each question was therefore
included in the model as the binary dependent variable.
The independent variables were the differences in the levels of
the variables. The independent variables were quasi-dummy
coded for all levels of each dimension.
For example, if the health state 1 (the “best” health state)
appeared on Option A but not B a code of -1 was coded. If it
appeared in both A and B, or neither A or B, 0 was coded; if it
appeared in Option B but not A, 1 was coded. This was per-
formed for each level of each dimension and ensures that all
coefﬁcients and signiﬁcance tests are of interest. This coding
ensures that comparisons are made between attributes and their
levels (including the comparison between adjacent attribute level
estimates), rather than limited to some arbitrary omitted cat-
egory. This coding ensures that the effects are uncorrelated with
the constant term in a manner similar to that shown by Bech et al
in a ﬁxed comparison DCE [53]. “Best” in this instance refers to
a priori expectations that higher levels of health status and con-
ﬁdence would be preferred to lower levels, more frequent visits
from friends/relatives would be preferred to fewer and that
quicker GP access would be preferred to slower. Table 1 shows
each attribute and its levels. The omitted level in each case was
level 1 (only health problem is moderate pain/discomfort, totally
conﬁdent, can see GP tomorrow and see friends/relatives daily).
The results described below and in Table 3, show decrements in
utility associated with movements from level 1 of the attribute to
levels 2 and 3.
As there were many observations from single responders the
assumption of independence of the error terms is questionable.
The standard response to this in health economics literature
appears to be implementation of a random effects probit model
[17,27], and this was considered in the ﬁrst instance. However,
random effects models account for correlation by allocating each
individual their own choice-invariant constant term. Thus
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random effect models simply allow for heterogeneous preferences
for choosing B over A all other things being equal. Thus it is a
rather curious solution to a problem as it is inconsistent with the
underlying theory and hence it is arguably more of a speciﬁcation
test than a genuine solution [54]. A more sophisticated model to
allow for different respondents having different (heterogeneous)
preferences is suggested. Heterogeneous preferences are examined
using latent class models [55] in a subsequent analysis. This
method allows for distinct groups (classes) within the population
to have different preferences for particular outcomes or attributes
in the experiment. The objective of the latent class regression
model is to not only estimate these preferences but also to estimate
the proportion of these classes within the population and assign a
probability of membership for each individual.
The inclusion of constant terms is a violation of the theoreti-
cal basis of the model, but can be used as a notional misspeciﬁ-
cation test, in that if the constant term is signiﬁcant there is some
evidence of model misspeciﬁcation. There is little guidance in the
health economics literature on the procedures for dealing with a
signiﬁcant constant; indeed DCEs in the health economics litera-
ture appear to suppress the constant and assume it to be insig-
niﬁcant or use individual-speciﬁc (choice invariant) constant
terms via random effects to “account” for the clustered nature of
multiple responses from each individual [30,56].
Sensitivity Analyses
A number of sensitivity analyses were conducted. While the
majority of the health economics literature has excluded “irratio-
nal” responses, this has been questioned by some authors
[47,51,52] who suggest that there may be a number of alternative
explanations for these responses. Therefore, a standard random
effects probit was employed to test whether the inclusion of these
responses altered the results or conclusions.
Two questionnaires were administered. It is possible that
responses to the two questionnaires were systematically different.
Thus a standard random effects probit was used on both ques-
tionnaires to identify any potential differences.
While it is argued above that a signiﬁcant constant has no
meaning in this experiment, the model could be estimated
without a constant (i.e., the constant term is suppressed). This
analysis was conducted as a sensitivity analysis.
GLLAMM techniques were used to identify potential hetero-
geneity of responses.
The appropriateness of each of the model speciﬁcations was
assessed using receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve.
These curves allow examination of the ability of alternative
models to discriminate between events and nonevents, in this
case responses to the questionnaire.
Results
Five hundred eleven patients who had participated in the RCT of
the EPP were sent a postal questionnaire. Of these 367 (71.8%)
completed one of the questionnaires. Responders were, on
average, slightly younger, more likely to own their own home and
be in paid employment compared with nonresponders. The char-
acteristics of patients who responded compared with nonre-
sponders to the questionnaire are presented in Table 2. The
characteristics of those returning both types of questionnaire are
also presented in Table 2.
Questionnaire
For each attribute, each level was presented an equal number of
times in both questionnaires. Thus in the short questionnaire,
each level was presented three times (excluding the levels in the
repeated question). In the long questionnaire, each level was
presented nine times; thus the condition of level balance was
satisﬁed. Using the fold over technique implies that there is no
overlap, that is, there were no instances where an attribute was
presented at the same level in both options of a single scenario.
Orthogonality was ensured by the questionnaire design.
Discrete Choice Experiment
Patients whose responses were inconsistent (in that they gave
different answers to the repeated question) were excluded from
the primary analysis (N = 98, 26.7%). The remaining 269
responses were considered in the primary analysis. Although it is
commonplace
to exclude these “irrational” responses, there is some discussion
over this [47,51,52]. Therefore, these responses were included as
a sensitivity analysis.
Table 3 shows the coefﬁcients of each attribute or outcome.
The coefﬁcients represent the impact of a unit increase of each
attribute on the probability of getting one answer (with all the
other variables at their mean), and thus the relative importance
of movements between levels of each attribute can be estimated
by dividing one coefﬁcient by another.
For example, if the coefﬁcient around health state 2 is 0.5 (as
health state 1 is the omitted category, this represents a move from
Table 2 Characteristics of nonresponders and responders by question-
naire type
Non-
responders
(N = 144)
Responders
(N = 367)
(average)
Responders
(N = 188)
(short quest)
Responders
(N = 179)
(long quest)
Characteristic
Age 52.5 57.5 56.9 58.0
% female 72.9 68.7 73.9 63.1
Accommodation
status:
Owner occupied 57.6 74.4 72.9 76.0
Rented from LA 31.9 18.0 18.1 17.9
Rented privately 8.3 6.0 6.4 5.6
Other 2.1 1.6 2.7 0.6
Condition:
Musculoskeletal 31.9 37.6 39.9 35.2
Endocrine 13.2 11.2 10.1 12.3
Circulatory 8.3 6.5 4.8 8.4
ME 6.3 7.4 6.9 7.8
Other 40.3 37.3 38.3 36.3
Employment
status:
Employed 16.0 20.4 18.1 22.9
Retired 33.3 39.8 36.7 43.0
Unable to work 36.8 31.6 37.8 25.1
Unemployed 6.3 3.5 4.3 2.8
Other 7.6 4.6 3.2 6.1
LA, local authority; ME, myalgic encephalopathy.
Table 3 Valuations of outcomes with inconsistent responses excluded
Attribute Coefﬁcient Standard error
Health level 2 -0.081 0.033
Health 3 -0.464 0.057
Self-efﬁcacy 2 -0.107 0.024
Self-efﬁcacy 3 -0.483 0.038
General Practitioner access 2 -0.055 0.018
General Practitioner access 3 -0.284 0.032
Isolation 2 0.024 0.021
Isolation 3 -0.426 0.040
Constant -0.148 0.017
Health 3/health 2 = 5.728; Self-efﬁcacy 3/health 3 = 1.041.
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health state 1 to health state 2) and the coefﬁcient on self-efﬁcacy
level 2 is 0.25 (similarly, a movement from self-efﬁcacy level 1 to
self-efﬁcacy level 2), responders valued the movement from
health state 1 to health state 2 twice as much as the movement
from self-efﬁcacy level 1 to self-efﬁcacy level 2.
The coefﬁcients reﬂect the reduction in utility associated with
moving from one state to another and are intuitively appealing in
that the coefﬁcients move in the anticipated direction. The only
exception is the movement from isolation level 1 (“friends and
relatives visit daily”) to isolation level 2 (“friends and relatives
visit every few days”), where the latter is preferred. This move-
ment is not statistically signiﬁcant and is also plausible in that
many individuals with chronic illness would ﬁnd daily visits
burdensome.
As expected, the movement from level 1 to level 3 is also
greater than movement from level 1 to 2 for all attributes.
The coefﬁcients around health status, self-efﬁcacy and, to a
lesser extent isolation, are of similar magnitude. In particular, the
results indicate that patients value a movement from health state
1 (moderate pain, but no problems on other dimensions) to health
state 3 (moderate pain, moderate anxiety/depression, some prob-
lems with self-care and some problems with mobility, no problems
with usual activities) as approximately the same as a movement
from self-efﬁcacy level 1 (“totally conﬁdent in ability to manage
condition”) to self-efﬁcacy level 3 (“not at all conﬁdent in ability
to manage condition”). A difference in “utility” between health
state 1 and 3 of 0.2507 can be generated from the EQ5D tariff
[57]. Thus the movement from not at all conﬁdent to totally
conﬁdent would equate to a gain of 0.25 QALYs if maintained for
1 year (and assuming that we can ascribe utility values from
patient generated responses rather than those of the general
public).
However, it is worth noting that the constant term included in
each of these models is statistically signiﬁcant. This constant has
no substantive meaning in an unlabelled experiment. In essence,
this result implies that responders prefer A to B, even accounting
for differences in the scenarios presented to them. Indeed, the size
of the coefﬁcient around the constant leads to a more worrying
conclusion. If scenarios A and B are identical except that B has
health state at level 1 (the “best” health state) and scenario A has
health state at level 2 (the moderate health state), A would still be
chosen as the coefﬁcient around the constant is greater than that
of health state level 2 (the movement from health state level 1 to
health state level 2).
A potential explanation for the signiﬁcant constant would be
the use of simplifying heuristics when presented with choices that
were closely matched. For example, individuals would system-
atically prefer the right hand option (B) when presented with
difﬁcult choices. This was tested by running a probit model with
random effects for each individual question giving each question
a speciﬁc constant term, a preference for B over A, after allowing
for the differences between B and A. However, this analysis did
not show any consistent preference for A over B (or vice versa).
Sensitivity Analyses
The inclusion of “inconsistent” responses did not alter the
results. The direction of the coefﬁcients remained the same in all
cases, although the magnitude of the coefﬁcients was slightly
lower with the inclusion of these data. Table 4 shows the results
of this analysis.
Estimating the model without a constant was performed as a
sensitivity analysis. The results of this analysis are presented in
Table 5. Although the direction of two of the attribute levels
changes, most remain the same and all movements from the
“best” level to the “worst” level yield reductions in utility. It is
noticeable, however, that the magnitude of the coefﬁcients has
reduced considerably.
The use of GLLAMM models did not change the direction of
the results for the majority of individuals, although these models
identiﬁed a minority of responders exhibiting counter-intuitive
preferences. Standard models used previously in the literature
would not have identiﬁed these individuals. Although the major-
ity of individuals have a higher probability of being in class 1
(78%) rather than class 2, it is noticeable that those in class 1
exhibits the same direction of values of attributes as the previous
models (good health is preferred to bad and so on), although the
size of these coefﬁcients is larger than previously estimated. For
this class of responder, the health 3 to health 2 ratio in this model
was 3.285, while the conﬁdence 3 to health 3 ratio was 0.793,
indicating that the individuals in this class considered a drop in
health state (from level 1 to 3) as considerably worse than a drop
in conﬁdence (from 1 to 3).
However, there are a sizable minority (approximately 22%)
who have counterintuitive values particularly for health state.
This latent class appears to value decrements in health states
while still valuing GP access (the other two attributes appear
much less important to this group).
Health state 3, which is the “worst” health state, is preferred
to health states 1 and 2. Although this raises some doubts about
whether the responders who may be classiﬁed as class 2 respond-
ers have understood the exercise, it is this class that does not have
a signiﬁcant constant term. This raises the question of what to do
with the preferences of this second class—do they genuinely
represent odd preferences or are they evidence that a subsection
of responders has misunderstood the questionnaire?
In the event that it is the second reason, the effects of misre-
sponders in the homogeneous model are to weight the prefer-
ences of the population toward 0. Note how the ratio of moving
down health states and conﬁdence in the ability to manage con-
dition increase relative to GP access (the level which apparently
unaffected by the latent class speciﬁcation). Table 6 shows the
results of this sensitivity analysis.
In order to examine the speciﬁcation of each of the models
included in the main analyses and the sensitivity analyses, ROC
curves were examined for each model. There were no sizable
differences between probit and logit models including and
excluding the constant term. However, the GLLAMM model
allowing for heterogenous preferences “improved” the perfor-
mance of the model in terms of the ability to distinguish between
answers.
Interaction Effects
The design of the long questionnaire permitted the estimation of
interaction terms between attributes. The results of this analysis
Table 4 Valuations of outcomes with inconsistent responses included
Attribute Coefﬁcient Standard error
Health level 2 -0.079 0.033
Health 3 -0.462 0.057
Self efﬁcacy 2 -0.081 0.024
Self efﬁcacy 3 -0.468 0.038
General Practitioner access 2 -0.072 0.019
General Practitioner access 3 -0.254 0.032
Isolation 2 0.001 0.021
Isolation 3 -0.462 0.040
Constant -0.120 0.017
Health 3/health 2 = 5.848; Self-efﬁcacy 3/health 3 = 1.013.
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are presented in Table 7. Few of the interaction terms had a
substantial impact on the results. Three of the “signiﬁcant”
results were interactions between GP access and health. It is not
clear a priori which direction these should take, although it is
perhaps surprising that these are all negative, thereby implying
that speedy GP access even in relatively poor health states is not
very important. Noticeably, the interaction between health level
3 and self-efﬁcacy is positive, indicating that if patients are in a
relatively poor health state, improving their level of conﬁdence
improves their level of utility.
Discussion
A response rate to a postal questionnaire of over 70% indicated
that patients were willing to complete the DCE. Results were
consistent with a priori expectations, adding to the theoretical
validity of the model, although a substantial minority failed a
consistency check.
Self-efﬁcacy is an important outcome, and patients were
willing to trade decrements in HRQoL for improvements in
self-efﬁcacy. This has implications for the interpretation of eco-
nomic evaluation in health care. Typically, economic evaluations
employ the QALY as a measure of HRQoL. However, QALYs
generated from the EQ5D instrument do not include self-efﬁcacy
explicitly. This analysis implies that, as self-efﬁcacy is important
and can be valued in terms of HRQoL, interventions that
improve self-efﬁcacy are more likely to be cost-effective than they
are currently credited with.
However, there are a number of caveats. First, it is not clear
whether self-efﬁcacy is a health outcome; if it is not then should
it be included in the objective function of a decision-maker
working within a budget constrained health system? Decision-
makers need to be clear a priori about what they are trying to
maximize and not use vague statements about other factors that
may be taken into account.
Second, this study surveyed people with chronic conditions
who had previous experience of self-managing and it is likely that
these valuations of self-efﬁcacy will be different from those of the
general public. Indeed, the EPP from which these patients were
recruited incorporates self-efﬁcacy as one of its aims. Thus, a
limitation of this study is that these patients’ values may not be
generalizable and are likely to overstate (or perhaps even set
a maximum value for) the importance of self-efﬁcacy, and
thus make interventions that improve self-efﬁcacy appear more
cost-effective.
Third, it is conceivable that changes in self-efﬁcacy (or part of
those changes) are already incorporated into the QALY, through
one or more of the dimensions of the chosen instrument.
It is also acknowledged that the use of DCEs may not force
responders to focus on the real opportunity cost sacriﬁce to
health by presenting a direct trade-off between health outcome
and self-efﬁcacy. This is likely to result in a greater chance of
over-stating the relative value of the self-efﬁcacy. Cookson [31]
demonstrated that individuals expressed larger relativities when
trade-offs were expressed in monetary terms rather than lives
saved—similarly in this instance trading off self-efﬁcacy may be
more palatable and therefore result in higher valuations than if
individuals were asked to reduce, for example, life expectancy.
In addition, the attributes included in the study may not have
been ideal. In general, it may be better to describe objective
outcomes as attributes rather than ask responders to imagine an
emotional or psychological outcome and ask then to value that
state. In this instance, given the need for a quantiﬁcation of the
value of other important outcomes in this patient group, the
design was considered to be appropriate, although it is acknowl-
edged that there may be other methods to generate these estimates.
Table 5 GLLAMM model
Variable
Latent class 1 Latent class 2
Coefﬁcient Standard errors Coefﬁcient Standard errors
Health level 2 -0.288 0.039 0.511 0.071
Health level 3 -0.946 0.058 0.651 0.094
Conﬁdence level 2 -0.243 0.038 0.160 0.063
Conﬁdence level 3 -0.750 0.049 -0.022 0.067
General Practitioner Access level 2 -0.017 0.035 -0.174 0.058
General Practitioner Access level 3 -0.240 0.044 -0.440 0.072
Isolation level 2 0.015 0.036 0.119 0.064
Isolation level 3 -0.649 0.040 -0.063 0.098
Constant -0.219 0.028 -0.025 0.045
P(class) 0.784 0.216
Health 3/health 2 (class 1) = 3.285; Self-efﬁcacy 3/health 3 (class 1) = 0.793; Health 3/health 2 (class 2) = 1.274; Self-efﬁcacy 3/health 3 (class 2) = -0.034. P(class) refers to the probability of being
in class 1 or class 2.
Table 6 Valuations of outcomes with suppression of constant
Attribute Coefﬁcient Standard error
Health level 2 -0.098 0.026
Health 3 -0.286 0.043
Self-efﬁcacy 2 0.101 0.026
Self-efﬁcacy 3 -0.235 0.036
General Practitioner access 2 0.021 0.020
General Practitioner access 3 -0.109 0.029
Isolation 2 0.126 0.023
Isolation 3 -0.167 0.039
Health 3/health 2 = 2.918; Self-efﬁcacy 3/health 3 = 0.8217.
Table 7 Valuations of interaction effects
Interactions Coefﬁcient
Standard
error
Health 1/self-efﬁcacy 1 -0.041 0.035
Health 1/self-efﬁcacy 2 0.034 0.028
Health 2/self-efﬁcacy 3 -0.033 0.026
Health 3/self-efﬁcacy 1* 0.050 0.029
Health 1/General Practitioner access 1† -0.065 0.025
Health 2/General Practitioner access 1† -0.099 0.034
Health 2/General Practitioner access 2† -0.080 0.030
Health 3/General Practitioner access 3† 0.084 0.022
Self-efﬁcacy 1/General Practitioner access 3 -0.005 0.030
Self-efﬁcacy 2/General Practitioner access 2 0.000 0.022
Self-efﬁcacy 3/General Practitioner access 1 0.017 0.026
Self-efﬁcacy 3/General Practitioner access 3 0.015 0.033
*Signiﬁcant at 10%.
†Signiﬁcant at 5%.
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Finally there are two methodological issues worthy of
comment. While the DCE seems to yield plausible coefﬁcients
around attributes two particular issues are concerning. First, the
continued identiﬁcation of a signiﬁcant constant term cannot be
ignored and requires further investigation. In an unlabelled
experiment such as the one described above (and many others in
the health economics literature), any value other than 0 indicates
a systematic preference for A over B (βˆ0 0< ) or B over A (βˆ0 0> )
all other things being equal. Where the coefﬁcient on the constant
term is greater than that of another attribute, the implication is
that improvement in that attribute would be outweighed by the
constant term. Evidence to the contrary exists in this experiment
and suggests a potential for model misspeciﬁcation. We have
examined a number of potential solutions, including the inclu-
sion of interaction effects and the use of simplifying heursitics, to
solve this problem but cannot explain the continued existence of
the signiﬁcant constant. There is little discussion of this in the
health economics literature, and where a signiﬁcant constant is
identiﬁed, the problem tends to be ignored.
Second, the preferences of a sizeable minority of responders
require further analysis. It is feasible that these are genuine
preferences, but perhaps it is more likely that a subsection of
responders has misunderstood the questionnaire. Alternatively,
the lack of an opt-out option may have forced individuals into
choices where they were genuinely indifferent. Indifference
between options has been described previously as an explana-
tion for “irrational” responses [52]. Other causes identiﬁed as
explanations for “irrational” responses include the respondent
including additional information not presented as part of the
experiment [38,52], contradictory preferences, and protest votes
[52]. Whichever of these possibilities is true is an empirical
matter, but may impact on the results and interpretation of future
DCEs, although the inclusion or exclusion of these responses
does not impact on the conclusions of this study.
Conclusion
Although self-efﬁcacy has been identiﬁed as important to patients
with chronic conditions who have been exposed to interventions
designed to impact on levels of self-efﬁcacy, it is likely that in
different patient groups other outcomes would be valued and
traded for HRQoL. These “important” outcomes should be iden-
tiﬁed before commencing the study and appropriate techniques
should be used to ascertain the rate of substitution between these
outcomes and HRQoL.
The lack of concern in the health economics literature sur-
rounding counterintuitive preferences and the possibility of
model misspeciﬁcation is disturbing. While these methodological
caveats should not preclude the use of DCEs in health economic
evaluation, these issues require further examination and suggest
that results of DCEs where these issues could be a factor should
be interpreted cautiously.
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